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After the reform of the tax distribution system, "land finance" gradually plays an 
important role in China's local government revenue, and has become the most 
effective and uppermost policy instrument of local governments in 
market-participation. On the one hand, based on the policy of "land finance", local 
governments implement specific measures of "investment attraction" and “city 
management" to promote the regional investment growth and local economic growth, 
producing political and economic duplicate benefits. On the other hand, "land 
finance" featured by the characteristic of "soft budget constraint" and low-priced land 
expropriation knocked off by the local governments to attract the investments, has 
resulted that land pricing cannot be in accordance with the scarcity of resources, 
distorting the allocation of resources in land market, against the establishment of the 
competitive factor markets. In addition, the fast increase of real estate price resulted 
by “land finance”, has also become the main problem persecuting the healthy growth 
of China’s economy. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the connotation, origin, 
formation mechanism, risk and system problems of China's "land finance", and the 
relevant measures and policy suggestions, so as to correct the distortions in land 
prices, straighten out the market of production factors, promote the macroeconomic 
structure adjustment, stabilize the real estate price system, deepen the financial system 
reform, improve the local tax system, and promote the healthy development of the 
economy. 
Starting from the rise of "land finance" of China’s local governments and the 
connotation of “land finance”, this paper deconstructions “land finance" mode, 
analyzes its causes, periodical significance and risks and thus reveals the institutional 
links between the current the “land finance” mode with the current revenue-sharing 
system. This paper argues that, in the dual context of fiscal decentralization system 
(vertical competition) and local competition regime (horizontal competition), local 
governments use "land finance", it is rational for local governments to employ “land 
finance” as their major income source. The crux of "land finance" is the unbalanced 
matching of fiscal rights and powers of office between the central government and 
local governments under the tax-sharing system. Therefore, to achieve the 
transformation of "land finance" so as to eliminate local governments’ dependence on 













balanced local fiscal and taxation system by cultivating local tax resources. 
After the 1994 tax reform, the unbalanced distribution of fiscal rights between 
the central and local governments is mainly solved by fiscal transfers. However, this 
kind of financial decentralization, on the one hand, will result in inefficient use of 
finances, inadequate supply of local public goods, and harm the efficient allocation of 
resources. More importantly, it is only financial devolution rather than property rights 
reform, which is still unable to effectively curb the local government to open up the 
"land finance" source of income. If there is no legal or budgetary constraints, "land 
finance" will be of great temptation for local governments. In view of this, based on 
empirical studies, this paper proposes the orientation of deepening the reform of 
tax-sharing system, that is appropriate financial decentralization to local governments. 
Through a more rational allocation of power and tax rights between the central 
government and local governments, periodical dependence of local governments on 
"land finance" will gradually be alleviated. At the same time, it is necessary to reform 
the land transfer system, substitute land transferring fees with land taxes, so as to 
suppress local governments’ incentives to “make money from the land” and ultimately 
change the current situation that local governments rely on land transfer income, to 
make up for the gap between fiscal revenues and expenditures. 
In short, the key to solve land finance system is to reform the current system of 
tax distribution management system. However, the key to promote the reform of tax 
distribution system is to sort out the fiscal relationships among different levels of 
governments, allocate rationally the property rights and the powers between the 
central government and different levels of local governments, stabilize the financial 
needs of local governments by building the main and ancillary taxes, continue to 
strengthen and optimize the two top-down transfer payments between the central and 
provincial government, establish the county-level financial security system, improve 
local tax management rights, and realize “collection and decentralization, unity and 
distribution combined”. In addition, the management of revenues from "land finance” 
should be standardized and ensured to improve people's livelihood. Otherwise, it is 
also necessary to reconstruct the local government competition system, and transform 
the investment-oriented governments into public service oriented governments.. 
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权被允许通过土地市场出让或转让。1986 年颁布并经 1998 年和 2004 年两次修
订的《土地管理法》，将通过土地市场出让土地使用权的行为合法化，并规定只
有地方政府有权将农业用地征收、开发和出让，以供应日益紧缺的城市建设用地。
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